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Cybersecurity research often describes people as understanding internet security in
terms of metaphorical mental models (e.g., disease risk, physical security risk, or criminal
behavior risk). However, little research has directly evaluated if this is an accurate or
productive framework. To assess this question, two experiments asked participants
to respond to a statistical reasoning task framed in one of four different contexts
(cybersecurity, plus the above alternative models). Each context was also presented
using either percentages or natural frequencies, and these tasks were followed by
a behavioral likelihood rating. As in previous research, consistent use of natural
frequencies promoted correct Bayesian reasoning. There was little indication, however,
that any of the alternative mental models generated consistently better understanding or
reasoning over the actual cybersecurity context. There was some evidence that different
models had some effects on patterns of responses, including the behavioral likelihood
ratings, but these effects were small, as compared to the effect of the numerical format
manipulation. This points to a need to improve the content of actual internet security
warnings, rather than working to change the models users have of warnings.
Keywords: cybersecurity, mental models, Bayesian reasoning, human–computer interaction, metaphorical
representation
INTRODUCTION
Safety and security while using the internet is a serious concern for many people, and an entire
area within computer science is devoted to dealing with the combination of cybersecurity and
usability. One common example of a security issue is when users encounter an SSL/TLS (Secure
Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security)1 warning as they attempt to visit a website. TLS warnings
can occur as a result of server misconfigurations, self-signed certificates, or malicious activity
(Fahl et al., 2014), so there are both fairly innocuous reasons and very legitimate security reasons
for a user seeing this warning. The issue of how to increase understanding of, and compliance
with, internet security warnings has been one of the hallmarks of cybersecurity research, and has
necessitated some attention to the psychology of users: what do people understand about these
warnings? How do users make decisions to proceed or not proceed to internet sites displaying such
warnings?
1For ease of reference, we will refer to SSL/TLS as just TLS for the remainder of this paper.
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Users’ responses to TLS warnings are relatively consistent: they
usually ignore them (Akhawe and Porter-Felt, 2013; Porter-Felt
et al., 2014). In general, previous studies have shown that users
do not notice (or pay attention to) security indicators (Schechter
et al., 2007), that users frequently ignore warnings that they
do notice (Sunshine et al., 2009), and that users are generally
oblivious to the possible implications of security warnings and
indicators (Friedman et al., 2002; Wu et al., 2006; Egelman
et al., 2008; Sunshine et al., 2009; Bravo-Lillo et al., 2013). More
recent results have noted that users do pay some attention to
phishing and malware warnings, whereas TLS warnings remain
generally neglected. So in addition to the basic inherent security
threats from ignored TLS warnings, there is now a danger that
such warning will receive even less consideration from users
because other warnings are perceived to be “more dangerous.”
There does appear to be some malleability in the effectiveness
of cybersecurity warnings. Different presentations of warnings
(by different browsers and being used by different people) yield
different results: only 33% of users click through the Mozilla
Firefox TLS warnings, compared to 70% of Google Chrome users
(Akhawe and Porter-Felt, 2013).
Mental Models of Cybersecurity
Internet security, and indeed the entire internet, is a
relatively novel context which does not have an established
conceptualization. What type of conceptual frameworks do
computer users bring to bear on these contexts? A prevalent
approach to this topic is to assume that people understand
cybersecurity through the use of particular metaphors, analogies,
and mental models that are more familiar (Camp, 2006).
To the extent that the metaphor used constitutes a strong
overlap between the target domain and the original domain, it
“works.” That is, the metaphor produces an understanding (or
quasi-understanding) of the new topic based on a preexisting
understanding of the established topic.
We can see a long string of efforts to understand and describe
computer technology via metaphors. One notable early example
is of computers running on smoke; when they break, all the
smoke comes out.2 Another example is that the internet is
a “series of tubes” which have a large but fixed and finite
capacity. Delivery of data is slowed when the tubes are “filled”
with too much material.3 More generally, a common metaphor
for cyberspace is that of movement through physical space
(“going to” a website, “surfing” the web, “visiting” a site,
“following” a link, etc.). Given the ubiquity of metaphors used
to describe computers and the internet, this raises a couple
of compelling questions for people interested in cybersecurity
issues. Within these presumed metaphorical conceptualizations,
what corresponds to cybersecurity threats? How do these
conceptualizations effect responses to those threats?
Researchers have identified users’ common underlying mental
representation of TLS warnings, based on the idea that this
representation is couched within a mental model of some other
2http://www.catb.org/jargon/html/M/magic-smoke.html
3http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/the-internet-is-in-fact-
a-series-of-tubes/2011/09/20/gIQALZwfiK_blog.html
risk that is better understood. For example, users could internally
model security risk as akin to a medical risk (viruses that attack
the computer, etc.), or as akin to a theft risk (evil doers trying to
steal money, property, or information), or as akin to a physical
risk (computers that could “crash”). Camp (2006) proposed
five possible models for communicating complex security risks.
The models take the form of analogies or metaphors to other
similar situations: physical security, medical risks/infections,
crime/criminal behavior, warfare, and markets/economic failure.
The idea is that these metaphors, or “folk models,” can be
leveraged and adjusted to accomplish security goals of people
designing computer systems to be safer for users (Wash, 2010;
Bravo-Lillo et al., 2011). (Note that mental models held by
laypersons differ significantly from those of experts; Asgharpour
et al., 2007). The generic TLS warning does little to encourage
or discourage these particular mental models, so users are
relatively free to adopt whatever mental model they like. Which
mental model a user uses, though, is proposed to affect their
understanding, decisions, and behaviors:
“Mental models can increase the predictive power of these
agents when there are commonalities in the models used
within a group, or when models used by one individual
lead to a pattern of behavior across several tasks” (Blythe
and Camp, 2012, p. 86).
“Each different folk model leads users to make different
choices when faced with these everyday computer security
decisions” (Wash and Rader, 2015, p. 1).
It has not been established, however, if having insights
into user’s mental models of cybersecurity is actually useful in
terms of identifying or changing their related decisions and
behaviors. That is, do different cybersecurity mental models
actually carry meaningful implications in terms of insights or
corrective actions, given the ad hoc nature of the models?
There is a substantial history of theorizing and research
on the role of metaphors in human thinking (e.g., Lakoff
and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987, 1993; Landau et al., 2014).
A prevalent position within this literature, as exemplified by
the above positions regarding cybersecurity, is that metaphors
are important and key for if and how we understand much of
the world around us. There are dissenting views on this issue
(e.g., Murphy, 1996), but the idea of mental model metaphors as
important factors has been dominant in the cybersecurity field.
The use of mental models in cybersecurity actually has two
plausible interpretations, which are sometimes not distinguished
but are important to clarify. A strong intervention claim is
that mental models are necessary in order to understand the
internet security situation (i.e., as a novel context, it can
only be understood via a metaphor-based model). This strong
claim, such as in the Blyth and Camp quote above, predicts
that understanding and performance in cybersecurity situations
is improved by the use of mental models; a metaphorical
understanding will always be better than no understanding at
all. A weak intervention claim, in contrast, is that mental models
supplement understanding of the internet security situation. The
weak claim, such as in the Wash and Rader quote above, predicts
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only that understanding and performance in cybersecurity
situations will be changed by the use of mental models. Mental
models will alter behavior, but not necessarily for the better. Thus,
the weak claim implies some understanding of internet use and
security on its own terms. To summarize, the strong intervention
claim gives a strong rationale for the existence of mental models
in this domain, but carries an implication that they must be
fundamentally helpful (e.g., Blythe and Camp, 2012). A weak
intervention claim does not imply that mental models must be
helpful, but it also does not provide a justifying rationale for the
use of those models in the first place (e.g., Wash and Rader, 2015).
Current Research Design and
Hypotheses
The purpose of the present research was to evaluate if, in
fact, different mental models of cybersecurity situations can
fundamentally change (and, by the strong intervention claim,
improve) how people understand and reason about those
situations. It has been proposed that some of the most common
mental models for cybersecurity warnings (and other aspects
of computers) are medical risk, criminal activity, and physical
security. The two general hypotheses for this research are thus:
(a) Per the strong intervention view, understanding and
performance in cybersecurity situations will be improved
by relevant mental model metaphors, such as medical risk,
criminal activity, and physical security (e.g., Blythe and
Camp, 2012);
(b) Per the weak intervention view, understanding and
performance in cybersecurity situations will be altered by
relevant mental model metaphors, such as medical risk,
criminal activity, and physical security (e.g., Wash and
Rader, 2015).
A challenge, though, is that one cannot directly measure
which mental model is active in a person’s mind. Indeed, the
issue of what mental models exist in a person’s mind, and the
extensiveness (i.e., “fleshing out”) of those mental models, is a
basic ambiguity within the mental models framework (e.g., Rips,
1986, 1994; Bonatti, 1998; O’Brien et al., 1998).
Our solution to the question of which mental model is
activated in the mind during the present studies is to explicitly
invoke the domain of the mental model metaphor (and, for
comparison, invoke the target domain of cybersecurity) within a
computationally isomorphic context. The mental models theory
implies that situations which clearly describe the different
mental models should produce distinct and different patterns of
understanding and reasoning even as the underlying structure of
the situations are identical in all respects other than the framing.
The following two studies thus present people with situations
that, while clearly invoking domains of different mental model
metaphors, have isomorphic computational properties which
people need to understand and reason about. Specifically,
the elements of each situation can be arranged as pieces
of information that can be used to calculate a posterior
probability using Bayesian reasoning. (Bayesian reasoning
involves combining base rate information with new information
to obtain a revised estimate of the new rate; i.e., a posterior
probability, based on the a priori probability and new evidence).
Why use Bayesian reasoning? Bayesian reasoning provides a
lingua franca across the different mental model contexts and the
actual context of internet security. It is an objective measure
of how well people understand and think about these different
situations. Bayesian reasoning also has a long history within
psychology of being susceptible to various factors, producing –
at different times – base rate neglect, accurate performance, and
conservatism (overweighing the base rate). In short, Bayesian
reasoning is generally a challenging task, which depends on a
full understanding of the situation and clear thinking about the
dynamics of the situation. Consistent with the thesis that different
mental models might influence reasoning and decision making,
Hafenbrädl and Hoffrage (2015) found that the contexts used in
different Bayesian reasoning tasks (e.g., whether the cover story
was about medical diagnosis, or predicting colored balls in an
urn, or about college admission exams) actually could influence
the responses of participants. Specifically, there were differences
due to factors such as whether the task involved a norm violation
or not and whether the stakes involved were high or low.
Lastly, research on Bayesian reasoning has also documented
that the format of the numerical information within a task
has a significant and reliable influence on performance.
Specifically, presenting numbers as naturally sampled frequencies
(a.k.a., natural frequencies) improves performance because
it both simplifies the necessary calculations and provides a
representation which most people find clearer and easier to
understand (Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995; Brase et al., 2006;
Brase, 2009; Hill and Brase, 2012). The effect of different
numerical formats provides a convenient baseline comparison
effect; a reference to evaluate the validity of the task and any
other observed effects. Interestingly, Hafenbrädl and Hoffrage
(2015) noted that the cover story context effects in Bayesian
reasoning (i.e., for norm violation and stakes involved) were more
pronounced when the numerical information was presented
using normalized numbers (e.g., percentages and single-event
probabilities) relative to using natural frequencies.
In summary, there is ample evidence that the structure
and content of Bayesian reasoning tasks influences people’s
understanding and performance on those tasks. At the same
time, it is a dimension of understanding and performance
which can assessed consistently across different situations,
including cybersecurity situations and the situations that have
been proposed as the relevant mental model metaphors for
understanding cybersecurity. The hypothesized effects of the
strong and weak intervention claims for mental models of
cybersecurity predict influences occurring in just these types of
situations.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Participants
Data were collected from 274 undergraduate student participants
at a large public university. The average age of the participants
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was 19.98, and the gender ratio was close to equal (157 females
and 117 males). Per the researchers’ Institutional Review Board
(IRB), all participants were given information about the study
and consented to participate. By electing to participate in this
study, these participants received credit toward partial fulfillment
of their introductory psychology course. Two participants
completed the primary task for this study but failed to answer
the follow-up questions, and they were therefore excluded from
those analyses. (This level of data exclusion due to human
participants failing to complete tasks is quite low, compared to
similar judgment and decision making research).
Materials and Procedures
Participants completed an online collection of tasks and surveys,
which included variations of a Bayesian reasoning task, each of
which was presented to roughly an equal number of participants
in a between-subjects, 2 × 4 design. All the Bayesian reasoning
task variants had the same basic form:
(a) A context was described in which a key event sometimes
occurs, predicted by a certain cue, noting that there is
some variation in the occurrence of event and the cue.
Specific information was then given about how often the
event occurs and how it relates to the cue.
(b) The specific data (which was identical in every context)
was that there was a 2% [2 out of every 100] base rate of
an event occurring overall, and these events all occurred
in the presence of the cue. Furthermore, the false positive
rate (the cue sometimes occurs absent the event) was 8.1%
[8 out of 98].
(c) Participants were then asked to judge the probability
of the event, given the occurrence of the cue (i.e., the
posterior probability).
This basic form was developed within one of four different
context stories; a cybersecurity context and three different
mental models which have been proposed for understanding
cybersecurity contexts:
(a) Cybersecurity context (the likelihood of unsafe websites,
given a security warning).
(b) Disease context (the likelihood of sick people, given
coughing and sneezing).
(c) Physical security context (the likelihood of physical
assaults, given a poorly lighted street).
(d) Crime/criminal behavior context (the likelihood of credit
card fraud, given a suspicious activity alert).
Each of these four Bayesian reasoning context stories was
presented in one of two different numerical formats: percentages
and natural frequencies. The Supplementary Material provides
the full texts of the stimuli for all the conditions. After the
Bayesian reasoning task, all participants were asked a follow-up
question of the following form (with details consistent with their
Bayesian reasoning task filled in): “Think about when you are
[in the previously described context]. You have [engaged in the
base rate activity], but then [risk cue occurs]. What do you do?”
Participants were given a 1–7 scale to answer this question, with
1 labeled as heeding the cue and 7 labeled as ignoring the cue.
FIGURE 1 | Percentages of participants who reached the correct posterior
probability answer to the Bayesian reasoning task, across the context stories
and numerical format conditions.
Due to the online nature of this study, participants were able
to take as much time as they wanted in completing the tasks.
Upon completion of all the tasks, participants were provided with
debriefing information about the research and their data were
stored with only an identification code, ensuring anonymity.
Results
Answers were scored as correct only if they were the exact correct
answer, but were accepted as correct in any format (e.g., 2/10,
0.20, or 20%). As expected, Bayesian inference was a difficult
task for participants, but providing information in the form of
natural frequencies significantly improved performance (7.4%
vs. 21.7%, collapsed across context stories, using a difference
of proportions test; Blalock, 1979): z = 3.37, p = 0.0004, and
h = 0.42 (see Figure 1). There was little evidence for the
strong intervention hypothesis, however, that any particular
mental model or metaphorical framing of the context improved
people’s understanding of internet security situations. In fact,
the cybersecurity context (not employing any mental model
metaphor) elicited the best overall performance when looking
across both numerical formats, whereas the physical assault
context elicited significantly worse performance than any other
context (vs. cybersecurity context: z = 2.60, p = 0.005, and
h= 0.50). If anything, the results suggest that the physical assault
mental model inhibited accurate situational understanding and
reasoning. We are forced to conclude that some of the most
commonly used mental models for cybersecurity (disease risk,
physical assault, criminal behavior) do not significantly improve
performance relative to a version of the task actually describing
a literal cybersecurity situation, contrary to the predictions of the
strong intervention view.
The weak intervention hypothesis predicts systematic changes
in performance across different mental models, although not
necessarily improved performance. The varying levels of correct
performance across contexts may support this view, and further
evidence can be brought to bear on this prediction by looking at
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FIGURE 2 | Percentages of participants who incorrectly answered the
Bayesian reasoning task with the base-rate (conservatism), across the context
stories and numerical format conditions.
other common (incorrect) responses. Two of the most common
erroneous responses in Bayesian reasoning situations are not
attending to the base rate at all (base rate neglect) or relying
too much on the base rate (conservatism). These correspond,
respectively, to the specific answers of either 0.919 (91.9%; the
inverse of the cue false positive rate [92% was accepted as a
correct, rounded answer]), or 0.02 (2%; the base rate). Scoring
of answers was again done, and base rate neglect was observed
for only two participants across all the conditions of the study.
Reporting of the actual cue false positive rate, failing to invert
it, was observed only once. The consistent absence of this type
of answer is unsupportive of the weak intervention view, but an
alternative reason for these results is that the tasks were simply
too difficult to elicit consistent answers (although note that rates
of correct responses in Figure 1). The rates of conservatism –
the answer of the original base rate without the new information
incorporated – are shown in Figure 2.
The rates of conservatism, like the correct answers,
were significantly different for different numerical formats.
Specifically, answering with the base rate very rarely occurred
with natural frequencies (24.3% vs. 3.6%, collapsed across context
stories: z = 4.96, p < 0.001, and h = 0.65; see Figure 2). There
was some limited evidence of different mental models changing
the patterns of answers; i.e., when information was given in
percentages the rates of conservatism varied from 15 to 43%
(a significant change: z = 2.57, p = 0.006, and h = 0.63). The
rates of conservative responses when the information was given
in natural frequencies, however, was very consistently low.
A comparison of Figures 1, 2 suggests an approximate
symmetry: the rates of base rate conservation are roughly inverses
of the correct response rates. This might be the best support for
a weak intervention account of mental models. At the same time,
however, the much larger effect apparent across all these results is
that of numerical format.
We now consider tendencies to heed or ignore the warning cue
across these tasks. Perhaps mental models do not make any major
difference in understanding or reasoning about cybersecurity
situations, but particular models could have effects in terms of
making people more attentive to the risks of unsafe internet
behaviors. The ratings of behavioral likelihood following the
Bayesian task were evaluated using a 2 × 4 factorial analysis
of variance (ANOVA; Fisher, 1925), which found significant
differences across context stories [F(3,264) = 20.267, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.187]. Post hoc analyses indicate that this significant effect
is driven by the crime/criminal behavior context being rated
significantly lower than other contexts (i.e., more heeding of the
risk cue), and the disease context being rated as significantly
higher than other contexts (i.e., more ignoring of the risk cue; see
Table 1). Thus, physical assault and disease mental models do not
improve desired perceptions and responses to cybersecurity risks.
Only a criminal behavior mental model may have some utility in
this regard.
The remaining results from the ANOVA were that the
likelihood ratings were completely unaffected by the numerical
format used in the task [F(1,264) = 0.389, p = 0.533] and there
was no interaction between the context story and numerical
format [F(3,264) = 0.743, p = 0.528]. The only other notable
result from the analysis was that the likelihood ratings had
unequal variance, with the cybersecurity context producing
more variable responses than other contexts [F(7,264) = 2.661,
p= 0.011].
EXPERIMENT 2
One might argue that Experiment 1 involved reasoning about
four fundamentally different situations, and therefore mental
models (or metaphors) were not actually involved. Or, along a
similar line of thought, that the different contexts were somehow
not sufficiently related to the target context of cybersecurity.
Lastly, there could be a concern that the results of Experiment 1
were somehow due to the particular numbers that were used (i.e.,
a 2% base-rate and 8.1% false alarm rate) or that the numerical
format manipulation somehow inhibited mental model effects.
Experiment 2 therefore involves a statistical reasoning
task that de-emphasizes the numerical format differences and
Bayesian reasoning aspects of the task while also explicitly
embedding the model metaphors within a cybersecurity context.
The results of this experiment thus focus on differences
in performance generally (as opposed to correct Bayesian
inferences) and utilizes a consistent question format at end of all
task conditions (even as that creates issues for Bayesian reasoning
TABLE 1 | Participants’ mean ratings of how likely they would be to heed (1) or
ignore (7) a cue within each context story and given different numerical formats
(with standard deviations given in parentheses).
Percentages
format
Natural frequencies
format
Cybersecurity context 3.5 (±1.8) 3.0 (±1.8)
Disease context 4.6 (±1.3) 4.6 (±1.5)
Physical security context 3.6 (±1.6) 3.9 (±1.8)
Crime/criminal behavior context 2.6 (±1.6) 2.4 (±1.1)
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 November 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 1929
fpsyg-08-01929 October 31, 2017 Time: 18:29 # 6
Brase et al. Representation in Cybersecurity
performance). These changes will allow further evaluations of the
strong and weak intervention hypotheses described previously.
Method
Participants
A total of 244 undergraduate students at a large public university
were recruited as participants in a study that was composed of
several unrelated tasks, and 234 participants actually provided
responses to the task in this experiment. The following data and
analyses therefore refer to this sample. The average age of the
participants was 19.70, and the gender ratio was close to equal
(108 males and 126 females). These participants participated
under the same protocol as in Experiment 1 with regards to
informed consent, receiving credit toward partial fulfillment of
their introductory psychology course, data anonymization, and
debriefing procedure.
Materials and Procedures
Participants completed an online collection of tasks and surveys,
which included variations of a Bayesian reasoning task, each of
which was presented to roughly an equal number of participants
in a between-subjects, 2 × 4 design. All the Bayesian reasoning
task variants had the same basic form, as described in the
previous experiment. In contrast to the task in Experiment 1,
however, the specific numbers used were changed to simplify the
task (a 1% base rate and a 1% false alarm rate), and the contexts
given were varied in a different manner (see full texts in the
Supplementary Material):
(a) A control condition context described a cybersecurity
context, using no additional mental models as metaphors.
(b) A Cybersecurity context + Disease model condition
described a cybersecurity context and also recommended
a metaphor of the disease mental model.
(c) Cybersecurity context + Physical security model
condition described a cybersecurity context and also
recommended a metaphor of the physical security mental
model.
(d) Cybersecurity context + Crime/criminal behavior model
condition described a cybersecurity context and also
recommended a metaphor of the crime/criminal behavior
mental model.
Each of these contexts was presented with numbers either in
percentages or natural frequencies, as in Experiment 1. All the
conditions, regardless of how the initial numerical information
was given, had the same questions at the conclusion of the
information given in context:
(a) Out of 100 websites, how many will generate security
warnings, either because they are truly unsafe or by
mistake? [i.e., asking for the total positive rate; this is a
new items, relative to Experiment 1].
(b) Overall, what is the likelihood that a security warning is
for a truly unsafe website? [i.e., asking for the posterior
probability, in a non-committal numerical format].
(c) Think about when you are on the Internet and visiting
websites. You have visited a large number of sites, all is
FIGURE 3 | Percentages of participants who reached the correct positive test
rate (2 out of 100), across the context stories and numerical format conditions.
going well, but then a security warning pops up to tell you
that the site you are trying to go to is unsafe. What do you
do? (rated on a 1–7 scale to answer this question, with 1
labeled as heeding the cue and 7 labeled as ignoring the
cue, just as in Experiment 1).
Note that, because the posterior probability question used here
(unlike in Experiment 1) is identical for both the percentage
and natural frequency numerical format conditions, we can
anticipate that his will hamper the performance facilitation effects
for naturally sampled frequencies. The Supplementary Material
provides the full texts of the stimuli for all the conditions.
Results
Answers for the total positive rate were considered correct for
any answer of “2,” regardless of format (numeral or written out
“two”). There was a very small, non-significant increase in correct
responses for the natural frequency format over the percentage
format (23.3% vs. 26.3%, collapsed across context stories; see
Figure 3): z = 0.53, p= 0.298, and h= 0.07.
Answers for the posterior probability were considered correct
for any answer of 0.5, regardless of format (0.5, 50%, 1/2, or 1
out of 2). Because this question asked for an answer in a very
open-ended manner, “what is the likelihood. . .” there was more
variation in responses, including several answers such as “not
likely” and “very likely” (these were not considered correct). As
in Experiment 1, calculating the posterior probability was difficult
for participants, and because of the very general phrasing of the
question there as not a significant effect of numerical format on
performance (14.6% vs. 14.5%, collapsed across context stories):
z = 0.02, p = 0.491, and h = 0.003 (see Figure 4). Inconsistent
with either the strong or weak intervention hypotheses, none of
the different mental models of the context significantly changed
people’s reasoning about the internet security situation.
To further evaluate any effects on performance across different
mental models for cybersecurity, we again looked at common
incorrect responses. The rates of conservatism (relying too much
on the base rate) and base rate neglect (not attending to the base
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FIGURE 4 | Percentages of participants who reached the correct posterior
probability answer to the Bayesian reasoning task (1 out of 2, or 50%), across
the context stories and numerical format conditions.
FIGURE 5 | Percentages of participants who incorrectly answered the
Bayesian reasoning task with the base-rate / total positive rate (1 or 1%),
across the context stories and numerical format conditions.
rate) could produce similar responses in this task, particularly
given the open-ended nature of the question. All responses which
could be interpreted as these types of responses (1, 1%, 0.01,
etc.) were therefore considered as errors of these type. Figure 5
shows that these were, cumulatively, fairly common responses,
unlike in Experiment 1. As with the correct posterior probability
answers, there was a slight difference across different numerical
formats, with this particular wrong answer more prevalent
for the percentage format, but it was again not significant
(35.1% vs. 30.5%, collapsed across context stories: z = 0.75,
p = 0.227, h = 0.098). Adding a metaphorical mental model to
the cybersecurity context, if anything, increased the likelihood of
these particular types of incorrect answers (Figure 5). This result
is therefore inconsistent with the strong intervention hypothesis,
but possibly consistent with the weak intervention hypothesis.
Turning to the rated tendencies to heed or ignore the
warning cue across these tasks (Table 2), a 2 × 4 factorial
ANOVA found no significant differences across context stories
[F(3,226) = 0.663, p = 0.576, η2p = 0.009] or across numerical
format [F(1,226) = 0.024, p = 0.877, η2p < 0.001], and no
interaction [F(3,226) = 0.346, p = 0.792, η2p = 0.005]. Thus,
Experiment 2 was unable to replicate the small effect of a criminal
behavior mental model on desired perceptions and responses to
cybersecurity risks.
CONCLUSION
The present study compared the effects of several different
mental models commonly thought to be used by people to
understand the nature of the internet and threats that exist on
the internet (i.e., a disease mental model, a physical security
mental model, and a crime/criminal behavior mental model).
The results indicate that users’ understanding of these contexts,
how they reason about these contexts, and their projected
behaviors within these contexts are very similar in many ways.
Specifically, the process of Bayesian reasoning (determining the
posterior probability of an event, given a cue) is similar across
these contexts: a known manipulation that influences Bayesian
reasoning, the numerical format of the information provided,
led to an effect across all these mental models. However, the
quality of Bayesian reasoning performance was not significantly
better with any of these mental models than it was with the
actual cybersecurity context. The implication is that the tested
mental models do not have an appreciable (positive) effect on
how users reason about these situations. Follow-up questions
found that the Bayesian reasoning context story was also not
related to their rated likelihood of heeding or ignoring the event-
predictive cue. These results are inconsistent with the strong
intervention hypothesis, which predicts that the use of mental
model metaphors will facilitate understanding and performance
in the target context (e.g., Camp, 2006; Blythe and Camp, 2012).
There are some results which fit with the weak intervention
hypothesis (i.e., certain incorrect answers may be more or less
common when different mental model metaphors are employed;
e.g., Wash and Rader, 2015), but that evidence is inconsistent.
The weak intervention hypothesis is, of course, not orthogonal
to the strong intervention hypothesis in this research. Specifically,
the strong intervention prediction of improved performance
when using mental models is a conceptual subset of the
effects predicted by the weak intervention prediction of altered
performance generally. One could possibly create a study
TABLE 2 | Participants’ mean ratings of how likely they would be to heed (1) or
ignore (7) a cue within each context story and given different numerical formats
(with standard deviations given in parentheses).
Percentages
format
Natural frequencies
format
Cybersecurity (no additional model) 3.6 (±1.8) 3.8 (±1.9)
Cybersecurity + disease model 3.6 (±2.2) 3.2 (±2.1)
Cybersecurity + physical security model 3.4 (±1.9) 3.2 (±1.8)
Cybersecurity + Crime model 3.2 (±1.6) 3.3 (±1.7)
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in which the results could in principle support the strong
intervention claim and counter the weak intervention claim (e.g.,
repeated evidence of only improvements across several tasks that
employed mental models), but that direction of research does not
appear to be necessary given the present results.
It is not plausible that the current failure to find improved
understanding and reasoning while using the various mental
models is due to systemic methodological issues or low
statistical power, because we concurrently replicated the effect
of using natural frequencies vs. percentages (Experiment 1).
It is also not the case that particular numerical structures or
posterior probability question formats were problematic because
Experiment 2, with simpler numbers and a uniform question
format, still found no effects of mental models. On the other
hand, Experiment 2 clearly and explicitly promoted the use
of different mental models of cybersecurity across different
conditions (including a control condition of no promoted
model).
The use of Bayesian reasoning as a “sandbox” for evaluating
mental models of cybersecurity is not the only possible
methodology one could use for this type of research. There are
a number of other “sandboxes,” if you will, which can be used as
methodologies for evaluating mental models of cybersecurity and
to access understanding and performance. Bayesian reasoning is,
however, a particularly well-suited arena for this type of work: one
can view many cybersecurity issues as a general belief-updating
situation, in which a person has a priori beliefs about their
internet security and they need to revise those beliefs in light of
new information (i.e., do Bayesian reasoning). One might argue
that the effects of different mental models on understanding and
behavior in cybersecurity situations are more subtle than the
present research is able to detect, but this raises a further question
of whether such small or fickle effects are sufficiently important
for cybersecurity research. Would they even cause significant
behavioral deviation if their cognitive counterparts could be
detected? One may alternatively argue that the stakes differ by
context (e.g., catching a cold vs. physical assault), and that this can
influence Bayesian reasoning (Hafenbrädl and Hoffrage, 2015),
so therefore these influences must be controlled for in order to
evaluate any effects of the contexts a mental model metaphors.
The difficulty with this argument is that it is essentially about the
partialing of effects as due to different factors, but these factors
have not been identified in any principled way (e.g., other than
post hoc).
There are also several further studies which can extend the
present research and assess its generalizability. For example, to
what extent are Bayesian reasoning performances predictive of
actual behaviors? (In other literatures this connection is well-
established, e.g., in the context of HIV tests, see Gigerenzer et al.,
1998, but does it apply to TLS warning responses?). It is also
possible that there could be unanticipated changes in people’s
responses if one were to factor in prior knowledge or behavioral
tendencies regarding TLS warnings, general computer literacy,
pre-existing preferences for certain mental models, Finally, the
present results are based on self-reports of likely behaviors, and
it is possible that actual behaviors (within cybersecurity or in
the analogous contexts) could differ to some extent in real-world
situations. It is possible that people are more vigilant or cautious
in their actual behaviors, although it seems at least as likely (given
typical gaps between intentions and behaviors; Sheeran, 2002;
Sutton, 2006) that people are even less responsive to risks in
actual situations. More ecologically realistic studies could address
this concern.
Practical Applications
Collectively these results cast into doubt the idea that using
metaphorical mental models to think about cybersecurity has
utility for internet users or cybersecurity research. The results
suggest that peoples’ thinking instead can be understood
generally (across all the different mental models) and more
directly in terms of how well they understand the risks, rewards,
and signals they receive in their environment.
From this view, greater focus should be trained on the format
and content of security warnings that are given to internet users.
This focus leads to an adjusted set of questions with regard to how
one can improve cybersecurity behaviors such as bypassing TLS
warnings (Akhawe and Porter-Felt, 2013; Porter-Felt et al., 2014).
Do users correctly and fully understand these warnings? Do
the warnings reliably and validly signal security threats (both in
reality and in the judgments of users)? It may be more productive
to fundamentally change the way internet security threats are
communicated to users, than to work on the mental models
users might impose on those communications. For example, the
security system could bypass giving a direct warning to the user,
but rather redirect them to a known safe site. Such a default
“opt in” system might then unobtrusively inform users regarding
why they were redirected and give them a chance to reverse the
safety decision already made on their behalf. This could not only
improve safer online behavior, but it could also encourage a view
of security warnings as more effectively protecting users (i.e.,
perceptions of reliability and validity).
None of this is to deny that people often have metaphorical
understandings (i.e., mental models) of internet situations. Like
a vast range of other contexts in life, people use metaphors to
think about situations (Pinker, 2000, 2007). Focusing on the
models rather than the actual situation, though, does not appear
to strongly predict understanding, reasoning, or likely behaviors
within the actual situation.
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